Music As Thought by Kaczynski, Dave
The Prairie Light Review
Volume 1 | Number 2 Article 24
Winter 3-11-1982
Music As Thought
Dave Kaczynski
College of DuPage
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cod.edu/plr
This Selection is brought to you for free and open access by the College Publications at DigitalCommons@COD. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Prairie Light Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@COD. For more information, please contact orenick@cod.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kaczynski, Dave (1982) "Music As Thought," The Prairie Light Review: Vol. 1 : No. 2 , Article 24.
Available at: https://dc.cod.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/24
Prairie Light Review, Page 7
Music As Thought
by Dave Kaczynski
Scarcely any student of music will deny that Beethoven is the
most cerebral of composers, the most philosophical, even if all ef-
forts to explicate his thinking thus far have resorted to feeble
cliches, hollow and unsatisfying, because inadequate. The pro-
blem remains: what is the nature of a musical thought? In what
sense is art, per se, philosophical in its nature?— In one sense, at
least, that it aims toward a radical disclosure of the world. So far
as the intention of an art-work is radical, which is to say, so far as
it endeavors to give voice to the world, we err badly as soon as we
aim to shape our understanding according to references or
statements. It would be a mistake to assert the philosophical
substance of Beethoven, for instance, by erecting asses-bridges to
"faith,” “courage,” “freedom,” “joy,” “affirmation,” or any
other such platitudes. Rather, it is most fitting to let the work
speak for itself. But this is not to say we must only respond emo-
tionally. For in order to hear anything at all, much less the truth,
we must first become acquainted with the manner in which the
work speaks. So the priority of a single question is established:
what is the nature of a musical thought? As the purest and
strongest musical thinker, Beethoven above all others may be able
to provide us with some clue to thinking through this mystery.
But we have set our question already within the framework
of an assumption: that the essence of art, from which music
derives, aims toward a radical disclosure of the world. This
assumption derives inescapably from the accessibility of art-
works. Speaking at once determines and invokes a world. Speak-
ing, of its essence, (as opposed to statements and references,
which merely inhere within a determination already spoken),
asserts the world as an issue. The accessibility of an art-work
gathers the work into our world. Conversely, our appropriation
of an art-work for the purposes of thought answers an appeal
which the work has spoken to us to enter into its world. Such pure
reciprocity as this alone constitutes a world adequate to our rich
experience, unconstrained by any parochial views. Modern
science and sociology, for instance, shape history according to
their own rather narrow devices. On the other hand, as soon as
we listen to Homer speaking, providing we listen according to the
manner in which the speaking develops itself, a world arises to ac-
count for the artist’s being able to speak to us at all. Nothing can
account for this ability but a world which responds to Homer’s
speaking as an invocation of itself. Any other understanding of
the world only conceals the truth of the work. Given this exalted
significance ascribed to art, it is not surprising that art-works
alone pass unblemished through history, inexhaustible and perti-
nent to every age.
So in order to hear Beethoven’s ideas, we must first
acknowledge that he dwells within the same place as other artists,
and discloses the same world. Since this is a world comprehen-
ding history, we must infer that the place where artists dwell is
eternal. If we notice that Beethoven occupies a place in the
developmental history of music, the observation is no doubt
jnusicologically accurate, yet much less helping us to hear
Beethoven speak it actually distracts us from the significance of
die artist as a significance derived from eternity. We have no pro-
gress in art comparable to progress in the sciences. Whereas today
a gifted schoolboy may surpass Galileo, the beauty of an Athe-
man tragedy, for instance, remains the effulgence of an enduring
mystery. Artists succeeding the Greeks through history were
neither better nor more comprehensive as artists.
So Beethoven as artist speaks an invocation of the world,
ne world speaks to us through Beethoven. Yet Beethoven, the
acknowledged master, is not just any artist. Moreover, the body
0 his work displays, as obvious, development toward what is
^unessentially artistic, also toward what is most cerebral. In
rebospect of the late quartets and piano sonatas, earlier works
assume the character of a pointer. As we inquire into the nature
musical thought, we come face to face with a life-work which
evolves as a process of thought. It is evidently the thought which
(
akes the artist a master. We are also keeping in mind that ar-
'c thought is what constitutes the world, and in so doing
aiablishes the eternity where artists dwell together.
But somehow the word “master,” though familiar enough,
“St give us pause. Mastery typically suggests domination: the
>ce of command. Yet we have already seen that artists disclose
e world by a process of invocation. An invocation is a kind of
t
rayer, and prayer suggests rather an attitude of humility. How
a
“ one who beseeches the world to appear also command it to do
Artists are often described as creators, but what is creation if
the quintessential function of the gods? Then who or what
' ^e artist beseech, and to what end?
In that we have surmised the nature of musical thought is
identical, in essence, to the nature of artistic thought per se, it
may prove helpful to draw comparisons between Beethoven and
one of his peers in another field of art. We would need to seek
for this purpose, a master-artist who is equally the quintessential
thinker. Who else, then, but Shakespeare is comparable to
Beethoven? The resemblance between these two great artists is
striking, for together they mark one epoch in art’s self-revelation-
the decisive emergence of art from aesthetic craftwork to
thought. No longer, after Shakespeare and Beethoven, can we
conceive of art and thought as independent approaches to truth.
This is not to say there were no true artists before Shakespeare
Only that our sensibility is indebted to Shakespeare for our
discovery of his predecessors. And here, too, we discover the hid-
den meaning of the word “master”: one who establishes com-
mand by virtue of asserting his freedom. But “freedom” is a
word we must take up considerately. It does not mean in this case
a defiance of rules and conventions, nor even an elevation of the
ego above its surroundings. Beethoven, the supposed rebel, for
instance, was much indebted to his predecessors, and consciously
so. Freedom may mean the ability to think. Or, remembering the
kinship between art and truth, it may consist in acknowledging
that when man loses art he has to start lying to himself. Of
Beethoven and Shakespeare we can at least assert that their
freedom as artists arose from discovering the inner element of art
and answering to all of its essentials. And the process by which
they answered essentials was thought.
But nor can we ignore a suggestion of challenge and
recklessness. A vying with the gods. If Shakespeare portrayed the
artist classically as Prospero, he also did so romantically as
Hamlet, and the latter portrayal is clearly the more developed.
Prospero is a master of a world within the world. Prospero’s
classical world is bounded within the world, whereas Hamlet’s
nutshell debouches upon infinite space. Prospero’s world is a
dream, whereas Hamlet’s dream is a world, ever mindful of the
world as world: “There are more things in Heaven and Earth,
Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Curiously,
perhaps, Hamlet’s freedom and fatality are one, and derive from
his living out the ramifications of this thought.
It is with similar fascination and consternation that we
endeavor to follow the thought-process developed by Beethoven
over his long career. It is perhaps inevitable that we submit to a
single moment now and then. But just as inevitably we are
pointed toward the end. It probably does not matter whether
Beethoven is possessed or possessing, and more than it matters
whether Hamlet is mad or only pretending to be. What shapes the
master is his access to the essence of art. From this place the
distinction between creation and discovery is rethought in a
radical manner, becoming on one hand synthesis, and on the
other hand the dizzying freedom of the artist.
So we are thrust back upon our original question. What is
the nature of a musical thought? As artistic thought, it represents
an invocation of the world. But this confronts us with a curious
problem. For we have long believed we understood how visual
and verbal arts set about to represent the world. A picture is
referred to a visual reality, and a word to some corresponding
tangible entity. In fact, it was scarcely more than a reflex on
Plato’s part to vilify artists for distorting truth when it grew ap-
parent such references and correspondences are habitually weak.
Nowadays we hold fast to the same misconception about art’s
nature by ascribing to artists a subjective vision or an idiosyn-
cratic emotional structure. By this interpretation, Van Gough’s
sunflowers belong to himself alone. And no matter how loudly
we acclaim the masterpiece as a celebration of romantic in-
dividualism, in effect we’ve relegated art to the status of a cathar-
tic, and our cheers drown out the invocation of world which the
artist spoke. Furthermore, we subject the muses to the indignity
of psychological examinations. We fail to account for the univer-
sality of art and for the artist’s being able to speak to us. Worse
yet, we’ve concealed from ourselves the manner in which the ar-
tist speaks. And by disposing of art from the substance of ex-
perience, we create the necessity of forever after having to lie to
ourselves.
But if words and pictures are said to represent the world, it
was never possible to think of music in these terms. If literature
and painting invoke the world by some other method than
representation, then perhaps we had best look to music for a clue
to understanding the capacity of all arts to think, and by thinking
to disclose the world. Here the necessity arises to listen closely to
an exemplary piece of music, such as Beethoven’s last piano
sonata. Doing so entails the task of rethinking what we unders-
tand by the world. In what manner is the world present here? As
“gold beat to airy thinness.”
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